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The empirical literature on the market for Ph.D. graduates is generally focused on individual
characteristics and their effect on scientific achievement, career prospects and/or expected earnings.
In this paper, we take a closer look at the context in which graduate training takes place. Using data
on 650 Ph.D. graduates from the INRA (the French National Institute of Agronomic Research) we
were able to show that supervision (described by characteristics of the Ph.D. lab) strongly affects the
number (and quality) of articles published during the Ph.D., as well as its overall duration.
Supervision also has a significant influence on job outcomes after the Ph.D. has been completed.
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High-skilled labour force (such as Ph.D. graduates) can be expected to play a major
role in a knowledge-based economy. Modern developed economies thus have to face several
important questions: what are the incentives to start a Ph.D. ? How to successfully complete
it ? What are the forces that shape a Ph.D. graduate’s early career ? In their attempts to answer
these questions, economists have traditionally focused on differences in individual
characteristics (such as performance, effort, Ph.D. funding, etc.). However, several clues
indicate that scientific production has become increasingly collective, especially in areas such
as biology and the life sciences. Stephan (1996) shows that the average number of authors of
an article in a scientific journal has raised from 2.5 in 1979 to 3.5 in 1993, and points out that
collaborative research leads to higher and better scientific output. Similarly, Sauer (1988)
shows that co-authorship leads to substantially higher returns in terms of wages. According to
these findings, scientific production can be seen as a collective effort, the efficiency of which
relies on the division of (scientific) labour.
In that context, it seems fairly improbable that the success of a Ph.D. student, in terms
of scientific achievement and in terms of career, depends only on individual factors. In this
paper, we develop an analysis taking into account, alongside individual characteristics, the
effect of supervision. The term “supervision” will be used here in a broad sense, to denote the
context in which the Ph.D. research was conducted. This context encompasses several
elements, such as: the intellectual framework in which the Ph.D. research is led, the financial
and material resources the Ph.D. student has access to, etc. This larger notion of supervision
leads us to focus on the Ph.D. lab as a relevant unit of analysis, rather than on the sole
supervisor.
To measure scientific achievement and the career prospects of a Ph.D. student, several
proxies can be used. After a short review of the existing literature (Section 1), we present our
data and methodology in Section 2. Three main proxies are identified in this section. For each2
one of them, we conduct an econometric analysis (in Sections 3 to 5). Conclusions are given
in a final section, and an Appendix is devoted to variables definition and summary statistics.
1. Survey of the literature.
In this paper, we are interested in two aspects of the Ph.D. degree: we want to explain
the differences in the scientific achievement of Ph.D. graduates on the one hand, and in
returns to the Ph.D. on the other. Presumably, these two aspects are not independent, but
rather closely related, a greater scientific achievement leading to higher returns. The question
of scientific achievement of Ph.D. graduates has not been widely addressed by economists.
Nonetheless, Abedi & Benkin (1987), and, more recently, Ehrenberg & Mavros (1995)  have
proposed explanations for the differences in the time to completion. Both papers focus
primarily on individual characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, postdoctoral plans or
financial support patterns. Using time to completion is a first sensible way to describe the
scientific achievement of a Ph.D. student: a (comparatively) better student may be able to
graduate more rapidly than the other ones.
However, another sensible, commonly used measure of scientific achievement is the
number and quality of publications. Although many economists have written on scientific
production, there are but few papers dedicated to Ph.D. scientific productivity. Papers are
more traditionally devoted to that of graduate researchers, either to explain its determinants
(Levin & Stephan, 1991), or to analyse its effect on wages and/or careers (Tuckman &
Leahey, 1975; Diamond, 2001). We feel that the number (and quality) of papers published in
scientific journals during the Ph.D. may be a good measure of the scientific achievement of
Ph.D. graduates. 
This indicator might seem restrictive, given the increasing delays between submission
and publication. In that perspective, a graduate whose time to completion is short might have3
a comparatively lower publication record at the end of the Ph.D. If this were true, there may
be an opposition between the two indicators of scientific achievement that we have just
considered. However, this should not be a major concern in the present study, since it focuses
on life sciences, a discipline in which the delays for academic publishing are still rather short.
One reason for this is that co-authorship is a common practice in that field, allowing a
researcher to submit several papers at a time. This tendency to an increasingly collective
research activity has accompanied the transition of life sciences from a "hand craft" to a
quasi-industrial production sector of science, similar in that respect to physics (cf. Acharya et
al., 1998; Henderson et al., 1999; Orsenigo et al., 2001).
Contrary to scientific achievement, expected returns from doctoral training have been
the subject of many papers. Attempts to evaluate the returns to Ph.D. have been conducted
primarily in Northern America: Hansen and al. (1980) evaluates pecuniary returns, in terms of
wages received in the academic and government sectors, while Ehrenberg (1992) extends the
analysis to non-pecuniary benefits. Studies in the United States (Stern, 1999), Sweden
(Tasiran & al., 1997), and France (Martinelli, Paul et al., 1998; Robin & Cahuzac, 2001)
suggest that non-pecuniary returns are fundamental in the decision to start doctoral training.
Indeed, a majority of Ph.D. students are attracted by the prospect of an academic career, even
at the cost of lower wages. It seems that academic employment yields specific advantages
(autonomy, lifetime employment / tenure, intellectual freedom, prestige, etc.) that compensate
the loss in earnings. These findings are consistent with the theory of compensating wage
differentials (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2000). In that perspective, career prospects seem to be a
very relevant and promising variable for who wants to evaluate the returns to a Ph.D. degree.4
2.  Data and methodology.
To investigate the respective effects of individual characteristics and supervision on
the scientific achievements and early careers of Ph.D. graduates, we will focus on a single
country (France) and a single field of research (the life sciences). There are, as yet, few
studies devoted to this topic in the case of France. As far as the field of research is concerned,
our choice was oriented by the fact that the medical and agricultural applications of life
sciences (commonly referred to by the term “biotechnology”) may have in the coming years
important economic returns. However, although European authorities have expressed their
will to develop biotechnology, the structure of research in that field is still far from well know
in France (cf. Lemarié & al., 2000, for a statistical survey).
The database used in this paper compiles information about 650 French Ph.D.
graduates in life sciences who completed their Ph.D. in an INRA (National Institute for
Agronomic Research)
 laboratory between 1988 and 1998. Data concerning the years prior to
1988 could not be recovered. The database was the output of a survey conducted in 1999 by
the INRA unit in Grenoble, on behalf of the institute. The INRA laboratories provided the
names and addresses of 1600 Ph.D. graduates. Data was then collected by means of a
questionnaire mailed to the graduates, providing a rate of return of 41% 
The INRA graduates are not representative of the whole population of French Ph.D.
graduates in life sciences: relying on a comparison with the DGRT
1 data (cf. DGRT, 1992, to
DGRT, 1998), the final report of the survey (Mangematin & Mandran, 2000) reveals that only
13% of all Ph.D.s who graduated in life sciences between 1988 and 1998 were trained at the
INRA. This is not a major concern for this study, since its objective is not to draw general
conclusions, which could be applied to all Ph.D. graduates, but rather to illustrate possible
links between supervision, early careers, and skills acquisition. In that perspective, the INRA
                                                          
1 General Direction for Research and Technology (part of the French Ministry of Research).5
data may provide interesting examples, all the more since the research conducted in this
institute encompasses almost every aspect of biology and life sciences
2.
According to Mangematin & Mandran (2000), the INRA sample (650 records) can be
considered as representative of the survey population (1600 addresses). First of all, the gender
composition of the sample is almost the same as the composition of the population (50% of
women in each case). Moreover, the proportion of ASC (a Ph.D. funding that is specific to the
INRA) in is approximately the same in the sample and in the population (16% of ASC in the
sample, and 13% in the population). Last but not least, the proportion of individuals
occupying academic jobs at the time of the survey are quite close in the sample and in the
population (approximately 40% in each case).
For each graduate, the database gives information on:
•   Personal characteristics (Date of birth, Gender, etc.)
•   Starting date and completion date of the Ph.D. (allowing to calculate the Ph.D. duration)
•   Career plans considered at the beginning of the Ph.D.
•   Education background and characteristics of the Ph.D. (Last diploma awarded before the
Ph.D., Type of funding during the Ph.D., etc.)
•   Research experience (number of publications in national peer-reviewed journals during
the Ph.D., number of publications in international peer-reviewed journals during the
Ph.D., number of communications during the Ph.D., etc.)
•   Post-doc experience (Post-doc in a university, post-doc in a firm, etc.)
•   Description of the first job obtained after the Ph.D. (including unemployment and other
non-employment situations).
•   Description of the job occupied at the time of the survey (i.e. in 1998).
                                                          
2 Some units are devoted to social sciences (e.g. agricultural economics, sociology of science), but these were
left out of the survey. 6
Moreover, the questionnaire provides a detailed description of the Ph.D. lab, including
the nature of its scientific activity (theoretical work, applied research, etc.), its relations with
the academic community, its relations with the private sector, etc. The main limit of this
database, however, is that it does not include longitudinal data describing individuals’
trajectories on the labour market. We can only observe the first job obtained after the Ph.D.,
and the labour market situation at the time the survey was conducted.
The survey of the literature conducted in Section 1 lead us to identify two measures of
scientific achievement (time to completion and scientific productivity) and a measure of the
returns to a Ph.D. (career prospect). Proxies for these measures were readily available in our
database. We used respectively the total duration of the Ph.D. (measured in years), the
number and quality of the articles published in scientific journals during the Ph.D., and the
description of the first job obtained after the Ph.D. For each of these proxies, econometric
estimations were conducted to estimate the impact of individual characteristics, as well as that
of supervision. The results of these estimations are given in the next three sections.
3. A significant impact of supervision on time to completion.
The duration of the Ph.D. was available as a discrete variable; for most observations,
the value of the variable was 3, 4 or 5 years (cf. Appendix, Table A). In France, a formal rule
states that a Ph.D. thesis should be completed in three years. This duration can be exceeded,
however, if the Ph.D. student obtains an authorisation from his/her university (and, ultimately,
from the Ministry of Education). Completing a Ph.D. in three years is no menial task,
however, and deviations from the three-years rule are fairly common. As long as his/her
supervisor guarantees that significant advance has been made in his/her research work, a
Ph.D. student will generally be able to carry on with his/her research beyond the third year.7
However, students who complete their Ph.D. in three years or less will generally be
considered as more efficient (or able) than their counterparts.
To determine how supervision affect the chance to finish one's Ph.D. in three years or















, with pi = Pr(yi = 1)
where yi is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the Ph.D. was completed in 4 years or more,
and to 0 if the Ph.D. was completed in 3 years or less, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables
(including characteristics of the Ph.D. lab), and β  its associated vector of parameters. 
In order to obtain more detailed results, we also estimated an ordered Logit model:
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with Pij = Pr(DUREEi ≥  j), where DUREEi is the observed endogenous (categorical) variable,
Xi is a vector of exogenous variables, β  the associated vector of parameters, and α j a category-
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The category j = 1 is not taken into account in Equation (2) for an obvious reason: when j = 1,
then Pij = 1 by definition, and Equation (2) does not make sense. Equation (2) predict the
probability for variable DUREEi to be in a higher rather than a lower category, or, in other
words, the probability for an individual to experience a comparatively longer Ph.D. duration.
Both models were estimated with the Maximum Likelihood method; the results are
given in Table 1. The definitions of the explanatory variables are given in Tables D and E of
the Appendix. For the sake of readability, we focus on the results that are recurrent across
both specifications.8
Table 1 : Logit models estimates for Ph.D. duration
Binomial Logit (reference : yi=0) Ordered Logit Exogenous Variables
Parameter (Std Deviation) Parameter (Std Deviation)
Constant (binomial Logit) -0.2891 (0.8804)
Constante1 (Ordered Logit) -0.8483 (0.8319)







Student’s nat. pub.  -0.1143 (0.0901) -0.0892 (0.0859)
Student’s inter. pub. -0.0758 (0.0465) -0.0079 (0.0453)
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Important -0.3917 (0.4413) -0.4568 (0.4183) Part of teaching in
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Important 1.1917 (0.4296)*** 1.2170 (0.3548)*** Ph.D. student’s








































Log-likelihood  -246.51 -336.52
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level9
Two results involve the graduates’ characteristics. First, a partnership with a firm
decreases the probability of experiencing a longer time to completion. The second result is
that an important teaching activity during the Ph.D. significantly increases this probability.
This second result seems consistent with the personal experience of many Ph.D. graduates.
Doctoral research funding at the INRA comes from a variety of sources: some Ph.D. are
funded by the Ministry of Research, some rely on private funds, and some are funded by the
INRA itself. Thus, some INRA Ph.D. students have the opportunity to do their Ph.D. without
having to teach, concentrating only on their research. Others may choose/have to teach, either
to accumulate experience or as an additional source of income. For these individuals,
completing the Ph.D. may naturally take more time.
Among the variables describing the Ph.D. lab, two have a significant impact on the
duration of the Ph.D. Thus, doing a Ph.D. in a team which publishes mainly in national
journals increases the probability of experiencing a longer duration. On the contrary,
completing a Ph.D. in a lab with numerous international publications decreases the probability
of a longer time to completion. In the light of these results, one may conclude that the
duration of a Ph.D. depend both on individual characteristics and on characteristics of the
organisation where the doctoral research is conducted.
4. A strong impact of supervision on the number and quality of Ph.D. publications.
In the database, the number of scientific articles published in peer-reviewed journals
during the Ph.D. is coded as a discrete variable. National (French) and international articles
are coded as two distinct variables. This is the only indicator we have as far as the quality of
publications is concerned. Previous studies (Diamond, 1986; Sauer, 1988; Diamond, 2001)
showed the importance of taking into account the quality of the scientific output. Given the
nature of our data, the simplest analytical method was to study national and international10
publications separately, since internationals journals have a greater impact factor than national
ones (as can easily be checked in the Science Citation Index). In each case, we first estimated
a Negative Binomial (NegBin) regression model, using the Maximum Likelihood technique
(preliminary tests revealed that a Poisson model was significantly biased by overdispersion).
The NegBin model is written:
(3) ln  λ iui =  Xi.β   + ε i, i = 1, 2, …, N
where ui = exp(ε i), and exp(ε i) ~ Γ (1/α , 1/α ). For both types of publications, a chi-square test
led to the rejection of the null hypothesis « H0 : α  = 0 », which did confirm the presence of
overdispersion in the ordinary Poisson model.
However, the important percentage of graduates who did not publish (67.9% had no
national publication, and 32.9% no international one) also pleaded for the estimation of a
zero-inflated NegBin (ZINB) model (Ridout et al., 1998; Ridout et al., 2001). This model,
which stems from the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model (Lambert, 1992; Greene, 1999), is
estimated by Maximum-Likelihood. The ZINB model is written :
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where λ i is the expected number of publications for individual i, and ω  the proportion of
Ph.D. graduates who do not publish. Xi and Zi are two vectors of exogenous variables; β  and γ
represent their respective associated vectors of parameters. Finally, ui = exp(ε i), where ε i is a
random error term and exp(ε i) ~ Γ (1/α , 1/α ). 
Table 2, sub-section 4.1., and Table 3, sub-section 4.2., compare the results of the
NegBin and ZINB models, for the national and international publications respectively. To
make comparisons easier, Equation (4.b) is not presented. Both tables suggest that scientific
productivity during the Ph.D. is influenced by organisational as well as individual variables.11
4.1. NATIONAL PUBLICATIONS.
Table  2: count models estimates for the expected number of national publications during the Ph.D.
Exogenous Variables NegBin model ZINB model, equation (4.a)
Parameter (Std deviation) Parameter (Std deviation)
Constant -0.4677 (1.8617) -1.8255 (1.4852)

















Numerous -0.3022 (0.3648) -0.3311 (0.3178) Contracts between lab





Numerous 1.0611 (0.3684)*** 0.7309 (0.3197)** Contracts between lab
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Strong -0.2643 (0.3318) Implication of the lab






Important -0.3415 (0.3371) -0.4114 (0.2899) Part of basic research





Important 0.6383 (0.4740) 0.2500 (0.3885) Part of applied
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α   1,3966 (0,2982)*** 1.4581 (0.2899)**
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level12
According to Table 2, the expected number of national publications is influenced by
several characteristics of the Ph.D. lab. Focusing on results that are common to both models,
we can give a “typical profile” for a lab where a Ph.D. student can increase his/her rate of
publication at the national level. This “typical lab” has a regular contractual practice with the
public sector (government, ministries, etc.), and publish the results of its research primarily in
national journals (which is far from surprising). The models also indicate that, on average, the
number of national publications is higher for the graduates who had a moderate (rather than
important) part of their working time dedicated to teaching obligations during their Ph.D.
4.2. INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS.
Table 3 (on the following page) reveals a significant effect of several characteristics of
the Ph.D. lab on the expected number of international publications of a Ph.D. student. These
characteristics sketch the typical profile of a lab where a Ph.D. student can expect to have a
high number of articles published in international journals. This “typical lab” has a strong
orientation towards basic research, the results of this research being published mainly in
international, peer-reviewed journals. Alongside this contextual variables, three significant
individual variables draw the typical profile of a Ph.D. student whose expected number of
international publications is relatively higher than the average. This “typical student” is a
male, with an INRA Ph.D. funding, and planning to follow an academic career path (either as
his/her only objective, or as a possible objective). 
These results call for further comments. First, the positive effect of an INRA funding
may be seen as a proxy for the scientific ability of a Ph.D. graduate: indeed, only a few
selected students may pretend to such a funding. In that case, this result simply means that a
higher ability yields a greater number of (good quality) publications. Lacking other proxies
for ability, it is difficult to further investigate this assumption.13
Table 3 : count models estimates for the expected number of international publications during the Ph.D.
NegBin model ZINB model, equation (4.a) Exogenous Variables
Parameter (Std deviation) Parameter (Std deviation)
Constant -1.0973 (1.0962) -1.4419 (1.0522)




















Numerous 0.2464 (0.1595) 0.2313 (0.1458) Contracts between lab
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α  (NegBin model only) 0.3672 (0.0597)*** 0.2377 (0.0528)***
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; * 10% significance level14
The second result raise the problem of rationalisation. Since the graduates were
questioned ex-post, they may have declared the job they occupy at the time of the survey was
the one they planned to occupy at the beginning of the Ph.D. Descriptive statistics show that
approximately 90% of the sample declared academia as a possible objective (66% of the
sample declaring an academic career as their primary objective). However, only 40% of the
sample occupied a permanent academic position
3 in 1998. Similarly, approximately 60% of
the sample declared having considered a career in industry as possible at the start of their
Ph.D. (while only 10% of the sample declared a career in industry as their primary objective).
Little more than 20% of the sample were occupying a position in industry at the time of the
survey. This suggest that, in both cases, rationalisation biases should not be a major concern.
Finally, the significant impact of gender on the expected number of international
publications suggests that some sort of sexual discrimination stills prevails in the French
academic system. This result is consistent with European and French studies on the inequality
between men and women in academic careers (e.g. European Commission, 2000; Esterle et
al., 2000).
5.  A significant effect of supervision on first job outcomes.
As mentioned in Section 2, the returns to a Ph.D. are measured by job outcomes after
the Ph.D. Our data, however, is not longitudinal data. Therefore, we can only use a variable
describing the nature of the first job obtained after the completion of the Ph.D. The access to













= Xi.β j, where j = 1, 2, …, m and where the category 0 is taken for reference.
                                                          
3 In France, assistant professors ("Maîtres de Conférence") positions are permanent, with no possibility of
dismissal except for misconduct.15
In Equation (5), pij = Prob(yi = j), j = 1, 2, …, m, and pi0 = Prob(yi = 0), where yi is the
observed endogenous (categorical) variable describing the first job. The endogenous variable
has m + 1 categories (coded yi = 0, 1, 2, …, m), and category 0 is taken for reference. Xi is a
vector of exogenous variables, β  being its associated vector of parameters. In our empirical
applications, we experimented with two different codes for the endogenous variable, leading
to two different models. 
The first model describes the opposition between research and non-research jobs,
without distinguishing permanent and temporary positions. In this model, yi has 3 modalities:
-  first job is a public research labour contract.
-  first job is a private research labour contract.
-  first job is another labour market situation (reference). This category
includes unemployment.
The second model is more detailed, yi now having four modalities: 
-  first job is a permanent academic position
-  first job is a non-academic permanent position (an “open-ended contract”)
-  first job is a temporary academic position : post-doc, ATER (teaching
assistant in a university) or ASC (research assistant at the INRA).
-  first job is another labour market situation (including unemployment) This
last category is taken for reference.
Models estimations were conducted with the Maximum Likelihood technique.
Each model was estimated with several alternative sets of exogenous variables; we’ve
retained the models for which Akaike’s and Schwarz’s information criteria were minimal. The
results of the estimations are given in Table 4 for the first model and Table 5 for the second
one. Both models suggest that, alongside individual variables, contextual variables may have
a significant influence on the type of job a Ph.D. student can obtain after graduation.16
5.1. RESEARCH JOBS VERSUS NON-RESEARCH JOBS.
The first model shows that some supervision variables have a direct impact on first job
outcomes. Three results are particularly significant: first, the chances for a graduate to get
his/her first job in public research are significantly higher if the staff of the Ph.D. lab is
involved in the editing of international peer-reviewed scientific journals. Second, if a lab has a
strong applied research activity, then its Ph.D. graduates stand higher chances to get their first
job in private R&D. Finally, a lab that helps its students define their career plans do give them
a significantly higher probability to obtain a public research job.
The first job outcome is also influenced by a number of characteristics which depend
both on the individual and his/her Ph.D. lab. Thus, the probability for the first job to be a
research (rather than a non-research) job tends to increase with the number of international
publications. There may be an indirect effect of supervision here, since the expected number
of publications during the Ph.D. depends on both individual and contextual variables (cf.
Section 4). Similarly, industrial partnerships during the Ph.D., which affect positively the
probability to obtain a private research job, obviously depend both on the individual’s
willingness and on the opportunities a lab can offer. Last, a Ph.D. graduate has higher chances
of obtaining a public research job if his/her research was supported by an INRA or another
public funding. The type of financial support a Ph.D. student may receive depends both on
his/her preferences, and on a selection process operated by the Ph.D. lab.
Finally, job outcomes also depend on variables that are more strictly individual. First,
graduating with the highest distinction (among four possible levels) increases the probability
for the first job to be a public research job. In the French academic system, the distinction is
supposed to reward a student’s own efforts, and thus may depend less on supervision than,
say, his/her publication record.17
Table 4: factors influencing the probability for the first job to be a research job.
Public Research Private Research Exogenous Variables 
Parameter (Std deviation) Parameter (Std deviation)







Ph.D. student’s nat. Publications  -0.1595 (0.1263) 0.0330 (0.0986)
Ph.D. student’s international pub. 0,1216 (0,0650)* 0.1721 (0.0791)**
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Pseudo-R² (Mc Fadden) 0.19
*** 1% significance level ; ** 5% significance level ; * 10% significance level 18
Second, being a female researcher decreases the probability to obtain a private
research job after the Ph.D., which reveals, again, some gender discrimination. Third, a
moderate teaching activity during the Ph.D. increases one’s chances to get a private research
contract. In that respect, teaching skills may act as a signal of one’s communicative skills
(ability to express oneself in front of an audience, for instance), a type of skills highly valued
by firms. Last but not least, an individual with a private-sector-oriented career plan decreases
his/her chances to obtain a public research job.
5.2. PERMANENT ACADEMIC POSITIONS AND OTHER LABOUR MARKET SITUATIONS.
The second model takes into account the dichotomies between academic and non-
academic jobs on the one hand, and between permanent and temporary jobs on the other hand.
Table 5 shows that the type of supervision given to a Ph.D. student does affect his/her job
outcomes. To enter a permanent academic position directly after graduation (which is possible
in the French academic system), a student should not prepare his/her Ph.D. in a lab whose
activity is mainly oriented towards expertise. He/she should rather favour teams where a part
of the activity is dedicated to fundamental research. The implication of the Ph.D. lab in the
editorial boards of international journals is a most prominent feature, which should not be
overlooked by students with academic career objectives. Finally, it appears that a team which
helps its Ph.D. students define their career plans significantly increases their chances to obtain
a permanent academic position.19
Table 5: factors influencing the access to the first job (reference: other situation).






Parameter (Std dev.) Parameter (Std dev.) Parameter (Std dev.)









Ph.D. student’s nat. Publications -0,0503 (0,1483) 0.1558 (0.0990) -0.2275 (0.1888)
Ph.D. student’s international pub. -0,0575 (0,0704) -0.1746 (0.1044)* 0.1482 (0.0666)
Expert activity of the lab Important -2.2247 (0.8567)*** 0.0257 (0.7433) -0.7506 (0.8801)
0.3789 (0.3663) 0.2366 (0.4693) 0.2220 (0.3786) Moderate
None /Unk. . . .
Numerous 0.0271 (0.5601) 0.0687 (0.7280) -1.3694 (0.6661)**
0.1750 (0.4001) 0.3946 (0.5146) 0.2755 (0.3855)
Contracts between lab & private
sector Moderate
None /Unk. . . .
Numerous 0.4959 (0.5177) -0.6862 (0.6631) -0.0706 (0.5231)
-0.1759 (0.4511) 0.0218 (0.5108) -0.4192 (0.4226)
Contracts between lab & public
sector Moderate
None /Unk. . . .
Numerous -0.3513 (0.5279) -0.1513 (0.6254) -0.8684 (0.5068)*
-0.1672 (0.3981) -0.9520 (0.4603)** -1.1144 (0.3979)***
Contracts between lab & European
Union  Moderate
None /Unk. . . .
Numerous -0.7367 (0.6362) 0.4088 (0.9384) -0.1849 (0.6482) Publications of the lab (national
journals) Moderate 0.1688 (0.5408) 0.7637 (0.8521) 0.3977 (0.5333)
Few /Unk. . . .
Strong 1.3007 (0.5057)*** -0.0627 (0.7368) 0.6494 (0.5467)
Moderate 0.2086 (0.3549) -0.8677 (0.4423)** 0.2917 (0.3630)
Implication of the lab in editorial
board of international journals
Weak / Unk. . . .
Important 0.7245 (0.5340) -0.0812 (0.6200) -0.2623 (0.5268) Part of basic research in global lab
activity  Medium 1.2443 (0.5351)** 0.7424 (0.5762) 0.2580 (0.5294)
Small / Unk. . . .
Important 0.2964 (0.6144) 0.2417 (0.9250) 0.3904 (0.7203) Part of applied research in global
lab activity Medium -0.2920 (0.5937) 0.2990 (0.8949) 0.6269 (0.6837)
Small / Unk. . . .
Important 0.2718 (0.6788) 0.1488 (0.7765) 0.1483 (0.5781) Part of teaching in global lab
activity Medium 0.7396 (0.6010) 0.3668 (0.6630) -0.2721 (0.5007)
Small / Unk. . . .
Ph.D. funding INRA 1.6836 (0.5379)*** 0.5666 (0.6009) 0.5846 (0.5084)
Other public 1.0156 (0.5445)* 0.0587 (0.6178) 0.2903 (0.4932)
Private -0.1751 (1.0530) 1.5742 (0.8359)* 0.8597 (0.8643)
Other / none . . .










Important 0.5966 (0.5546) 0.4625 (0.6891) 0.7780 (0.5079) Ph.D. student’s teaching activity
Medium -0.4055 (0.3910) -0.3205 (0.5059) -0.0006 (0.4048)
Low / Null . . .















































Pseudo R² (Mc Fadden) 0.26
*** 1% significance level ; ** 5% significance level ; * 10% significance level20
The contracting activity of the lab also matters: an important number of contracts with
private firms, and/or a moderate number of contracts with the European Union significantly
decrease the probability for a Ph.D. graduate to end up on a temporary position (post-doc,
ATER, ASC). The contracting activity of the lab may provide the students with extra funds,
and extra employment opportunities. For instance, doing research on the basis of private funds
can send a positive signal to potential employers in the private sector.
With respect to individual characteristics, two results can be highlighted. First, having
one’s Ph.D. funded by the INRA does significantly increases one’s probability of obtaining a
permanent academic position. This may be linked to the specificity of the INRA funding: it is
often attributed to a Ph.D. student whose profile present some ex ante interest for the Institute,
and who will often be recruited by the Institute after graduation. The second result is simply
that graduating with the highest distinction significantly increases the chances to obtain a
permanent academic position. Finally, we observe a significant effect of the year of
completion over the period 1988-1998: the more recent generations of Ph.D. graduates face
lower probabilities to obtain a permanent position, be it academic or not. Those generations
have higher chances to obtain a temporary academic position. Over the period, employment
conditions on the academic labour market have thus worsened; it has gradually become more
and more difficult to obtain good returns to a Ph.D..
6. Conclusion: implications and directions for further research.
The aim of this paper was to explore the following hypothesis: a Ph.D. student’s
scientific achievements and career prospects may not be determined solely by his/her
individual characteristics. Contextual elements (namely, the type of training and supervision)
may also have an impact. Our first empirical results tend to validate this hypothesis: the Ph.D.
duration, the expected number of publications during the Ph.D., and early careers, are all21
influenced both by individual and organisational variables (the latter mainly describing the
Ph.D. lab). This result do not deny the possibility for some students to have a higher scientific
potential (or to be able to work harder) than others.
In fact, the significant impact of (some) characteristics of the Ph.D. lab may be
interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, it could mean that the type of training
received during the Ph.D. actually helps fostering and shaping an individual’s scientific skills.
According to this interpretation, the Ph.D. students benefit largely from their lab's resources,
reputation and scientific network. On the other hand, it may simply be seen as the observable
effect of unobserved individual characteristics. This may occur if the INRA laboratories exert
some strong selective pressure when recruiting their Ph.D. students. In that case, the most
prestigious Ph.D. labs (e.g., those where the valorisation of the research is done through
publications in international journals) simply select the more able students.
It may be necessary, in some further research, to try and distinguish between these
alternative interpretations, using appropriate techniques (such as treatment effect models) and
keeping in mind that each one of them may have some relevance. Meanwhile, some
implications can nevertheless be derived from our results, both for prospective Ph.D.
graduates and for science policy makers.
Students should consider the possibility that individual performance may be a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for success (in terms of scientific achievement and/or
careers). They should carefully choose their Ph.D. labs, according to their career plans. For
instance, students planning an academic career should try to find a lab with an international
scientific recognition, whereas those looking for a career in private R&D should choose a lab
where contracting with firms is a common practice. However, French research laboratories
are often very reluctant to inform students about their publication activity, academic ranking,
or contractual practices. The decision to start a Ph.D. is not a minor one: it has long-term22
consequences on an individual’s career and personal life. Students should therefore be given
detailed prior information in order to be able to take the most appropriate decision. 
  Other implications, regarding science policy, may stem from our empirical analysis.
Admittedly, scientists are a key input in the innovation process, which can spur economic
growth. However, most Ph.D. graduates are trained primarily for academic research. To foster
private R&D and thus increase economic growth, more Ph.D. graduates have to be trained for
research in the private sector. This argument has been developed by Romer (2000) in the
USA, but still holds on the case of France. Our results may be helpful in indicating how to
achieve this objective in a French context: broadly speaking, the government could support
laboratories that can provide effective training for private R&D. For instance, a budget bonus
could be given to labs that develop partnerships with firms, and encourage their students to
participate. Such measures should be carefully thought over, in order to develop the national
private R&D effort without weakening the existing scientific institutions.
To ascertain all these implications, however, more empirical research is needed. The
sample used in this paper was rather specific, since it did only consist of Ph.D. graduates from
the INRA. To broaden the scope of the analysis, data on other Ph.D. graduates (from several
disciplines and/or countries) is required. Moreover, the possibility of gender discrimination
(as that unravelled in our data) pleads for more comparative studies on male and female Ph.D.
graduates. More detailed information about individual performance before the Ph.D. may also
be helpful if treatment effects models are to be estimated, as we suggested above. Finally,
longitudinal data on individual career paths (and possibly on individual publication records)
would also be quite useful: our data did not allow us to look beyond the first job, nor did it
provide a yearly record of publications. The use of duration models on longitudinal data
would make a “long run” analysis possible. However, databases combining such data with
detailed information on supervision are still rather hard to come by.23
APPENDIX: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table A: Ph.D. duration  
Ph.D. duration in years Number of graduates Percentage
Less than 3 years 34 5.2 %
3 years 224 34.4 %
3.5 years 210 32.2 %
4 years 123 18.9 %
More than 4 years 57 8.7 %
Missing values 4 0.6 %
Maximal duration: 10 years; average duration: 3.5 years (Std deviation : 1.17); median duration: 3.17 years.
Table B: publications during the Ph.D.
Publications Number of graduates Percentage
In national peer-reviewed journals:
Zero 439 67.9 %
1 or 2 159 24.5%
More than 2 49 7.6 %
In international peer-reviewed journals:
Zero  213 32.9 %
1 or 2 183 28.3 %
More than 2 251 38.8 %
In both type of journals :
Zero 167 25.8 %
1 or 2 167 25.8 %
Plus de 2 313 48.4 %
NB : 5 missing values.
Table C: first job outcomes 
First job (research versus non-research) Number of graduates Percentage
Public research job 279 56.7
Private research job 71 14.4
Non-research job 142 28.9
Total 492 100,0 %
First job (four-categories variable) Number of graduates Percentage
Permanent academic position 157 31,9 %
Other permanent position 57 11,6 %
ATER, ASC, Post-doc 95 19,5 %
Other situation 183 37.0 %
Total 492 100,0 %24
Table D : Summary statistics for the lab-specific explanatory variables (all models)
Variable Mean (Std Deviation)
Student had a supervising committee
4 (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.21 (0.41)
Expert activity of the Ph.D. lab is:  Important (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.08 (0.27)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.36 (0.48)
None/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.56 (0.50)
Contracts between lab & private sector are:  Numerous (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.20 (0.40)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.53 (0.50)
None/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.27 (0.44)
Contracts between lab & public sector are:  Numerous (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.32 (0.47)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.48 (0.50)
None/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.20 (0.40)
Contracts between lab & European Union are: Numerous (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.25 (0.44)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.47 (0.50)
None/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.27 (0.45)
Publications of the lab in national journals are: Numerous (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.23 (0.42)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.67 (0.47)
Few/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.10 (0.30)
Publications of the lab in international journals are: Numerous (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.68(0.47)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.29 (0.46)
Few/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.02 (0.15)
Implication of the lab in editorial board of international journals is :
Strong (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.15 (0.36)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.41 (0.49)
Weak/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.44 (0.50)
Part of basic research in global lab activity is:  Important (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.47 (0.50)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.38 (0.49)
Small/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.15 (0.36)
Part of applied research in global lab activity is: Important (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.51 (0.50)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.40 (0.49)
Small/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.09 (0.28)
Part of teaching in global lab activity is:  Important (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.22 (0.41)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.68 (0.47)
Small/unknown (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.10 (0.31)
Student discussed vocational plans with lab member(s) (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.42 (0.49)
Ph.D. lab helped to define vocational plans (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.34 (0.48)
                                                          
4 Some Ph.D. students can, in addition to their supervisor’s help, benefit from the scientific advises of a
“supervising committee”, whose members are other senior researchers and/or industrial experts. The committee
meets at regular intervals during the course of the Ph.D. 25
Table E : Summary statistics for the other explanatory variables (all models)
Variable Mean (Std Deviation)
Age at completion (in years) 28.4 (2.0)  Median: 28
Gender (1 if male, 0 if female) 0.46 (0.50)
Student’s national publications (number of) 0.58 (1.37) min: 0 Max: 20
Student’s international publications (number of) 2.56 (2.76) min: 0 Max: 30
INRA Ph.D. Funding 0.33 (0.47)
Other public Ph.D. Funding 0.45 (0.50)
Private Ph.D. Funding 0.06 (0.24)
Other Ph.D. Funding 0.09 (0.29)
Partnership with a firm during Ph.D. 0.26 (0.44)
Ph.D. student’s teaching activity was:  Important (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.12 (0.33)
Moderate (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.21 (0.41)
Low / null (1 if yes, 0 if no) 0.64 (0.48)
Year of completion, coded from 1 (1988) to 11 (1998) 7.1 (2.7) Median: 7
When student started Ph.D., he/she considered academic career as a possible
outcome (1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.94 (0.23)
When student started Ph.D., he/she considered career in industry (private sector)
as a possible outcome (1 if yes, 0 if no)
0.60 (0.49)
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